Reporting Framework
The regulatory framework for disclosure of director and executive remuneration by listed corporations in Australia is relatively new phenomenon, and is driven by ASX Listing Rule 4.1 requires listed companies to provide a statement in their annual report disclosing the extent to which they have followed the best practice recommendations (Deloitte, 2003, p. 20) set out in the ASX Corporate Governance Council's Principles of Good Corporate Governance Practice and Best Practice Recommendations (2003) . Principle 9 of the Recommendations requires disclosure of remuneration policies in a transparent and readily understandable framework, compliance with annual disclosure requirements under the Corporations Act (2001) , and continuous disclosure on employment agreements with key executives.
AASB 1046 'Director and Executive Disclosures by Disclosing Entities' was
introduced with the aim of "improving the quality of disclosures relevant to individuals responsible for governance of listed entities" (ICAA, 2006 (ICAA, , p. 1275 ).
This Standard is applicable to annual reporting periods ending on or after 30 June requirements for AASB 1046 are extensive. The Standard requires detailed disclosure of the rewards provided to corporate directors and executives. This information is fairly sensitive and one that many stakeholders take a great deal of interest in (Deegan, 2005, p. 831) .
Section 300A of the Corporations Act (2001) came into operation from July 2004 and was aimed at addressing concerns about the failure to disclose payments made to directors (Deegan, 2005, p. 838) . Section 300A requires listed companies to provide a 'Remuneration Report' to appear in the Director's Report. Among other things, the Remuneration Report is to provide information about the remuneration of all directors and the five highest paid executives; information about the Board's policy for determining remuneration; and a discussion on the relationships between the remuneration policy and the company's performance. There is much duplication between s. 300A of the Corporations Act and AASB 1046, however, the disclosures required by s. 300A are to be made in the Directors' Report, whereas the disclosures required by AASB 1046 are to be made in the notes to the financial report.
Together, the ASX Listing Rules, AASB 1024 and s. 300A of the Corporations Act form an overlapping prescriptive regulatory framework for the disclosure of director and executive remuneration for listed firms in Australia. In the next section of this paper, the disclosure of a sample of listed firms will be examined to examine the uniformity, or otherwise, of current disclosure practice in this area.
Sample of Firms
A selection of ten (10) A visual inspection of the data in Table 1 shows nine of the ten firms have a 30
June reporting date, with one firm reporting at 31 March. The ten firms cover a range of GICS sectors comprising: materials (2); diversified financials (2); information technology (2); energy (1); and consumer discretionary (3). The market capitalisation (as at August 2006) of the firms covered a broad range comprising; 2 micro-caps (less than $5 million); 4 small-caps (less than $20 million); 2 mid-caps (less than $1,000 million); 2 large-caps (more than $1,000 million). The head office location of the ten firms was: Sydney (3); Melbourne In all, this sample represents a very broad range of firms to study the diversity of disclosure practise in Australian listed firms in 2006.
Observations from Sample of Firms
The annual reports for 2006 of the sample companies were reviewed, in particular the disclosure regarding the Remuneration Report. The number of pages of the annual report that contained information on this issue was totalled, as was the number of pages for the total annual report.
The disclosure regarding, (a) the amounts of rewards paid and, (b) the remuneration policy was examined and compared against the regulations as well as contrasted with the other companies in the sample. Where this was found to be meaningful and compliant it was coded as "Yes". Also evidence was sought in the commentary of the annual report (especially the Director's report) that linked the remuneration policy and the company's performance. Where this evidence existed it was coded "Yes", otherwise "No". A summary of the results is presented in Table 2 below. All ten firms in the sample complied with the regulatory requirements and included disclosure on director and executive remuneration, suggesting high levels of uniformity among preparers.
All ten firms provided a detailed analysis of the type and the amount of each reward paid to each director, and where applicable, the top five executives. Even where there was no remuneration paid to directors (as in the case of Altera Capital and Sofcom in 2006), this disclosure was still prepared, again suggesting high levels of uniformity.
All of the ten firms clearly articulated their remuneration policy, however only four of the ten firms provided any disclosure on the link between the remuneration policy and the company's performance. BlueScope Steel provided the most detailed positive disclosure in this area devoting some six pages to this issue alone. Of the six firms that did not make a positive disclosure in this area, these firms had each made a statement similar to Merchant House International; "the [remuneration] policy does not relate individual compensation with entity performance". While this disclosure is compliant with the regulations, it does not provide any value to the user.
Interestingly, across the sample, the six firms that did not have a positive statement linking remuneration with firm performance were also the smallest firms in the sample (all 2 micro-caps plus all 4 small-caps) suggesting this level of disclosure is only being provided by mid-cap sized firms and larger.
On average, 7.7% of the total pages in the sample of 2006 annual reports were devoted to disclosure on director and executive remuneration, with Webjet and BlueScope Steel devoting 11.6% and 12.9% respectively of their annual reports to this issue.
Overall, there was a high degree of uniformity in disclosure among all firms, with much higher quality voluntary disclosure in firms with larger market capitalisation (greater than $20 million). The next section of the paper will look at the factors driving disclosure, before offering a conclusion.
Factors Driving Disclosure
Full and understandable disclosure of director and executive remuneration has emerged over the past two years and is now a mandatory requirement for all listed Australian firms. The aim of this regulation is to achieve a more effective overall standard of dialogue between the company and its investors.
To comply with the requirements of ASX Listing Rules, accounting standards and the Corporations Act, Australian listed companies are devoting on average 4.7 pages of their annual reports (7.7% of total pages) to director and executive remuneration disclosure. The cost of preparing and reporting this information is high, but the regulators obviously consider these costs to be outweighed by the associated benefits (Deegan, 2005, p. 843 ).
An immediate benefit to the firm making the disclosure would be to reduce the number of general meetings featuring director and executive remuneration issues and the subsequent media profiling (Deloitte, 2003, p. 19) . However, the underlying motivation for companies to make improvements (voluntary disclosures) to their director and executive remuneration are: firstly, to get investors to trust management with their money -the Agency problem (Uren, 2003, p. 192) ; and secondly to improve the value of the company (Healy & Palepu, 2001) . But these initiatives come at a cost that small size firms may not yet prepared to pay.
Conclusion
The disclosure of director and executive remuneration in Australian listed companies has been a mandatory requirement since 2004. In the two year period to 2006, Australian firms have developed detailed and comprehensive disclosures to inform users of their rewards and policies. On average, this disclosure accounts for 7.7% of the total pages in the annual report. The disclosure practices of Australian firms have quickly evolved to achieve high levels of uniformity across a wide range of companies, with most of the sample companies meeting the minimum regulatory requirements being covered in 2-3 pages of the annual report. This is most likely due to the prescriptive nature of the regulations meaning that the disclosure framework is easy to adopt and implement.
Larger size firms (greater than $20 million market capitalisation) show higher levels of innovation in their voluntary disclosure, providing more detailed discussion on the relationships between the remuneration policy and the company's performance. This is in contrast to the smaller size firms that have not yet developed remuneration policies that relate individual compensation with entity performance.
